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POLICY ISSUES IN THE ROUTING OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHIPMENTS
ROGER D. NORTON*

1. INTRODUCTION
Radioactive materials have been transported in the United States
since the beginning of the atomic era, and for most of that time this
transportation has drawn little public comment. Nuclear weapons
and then nuclear power facilities occupied policy makers' and public
commentators' attention initially, and subsequently it became evident that the geological and institutional problems of nuclear waste
disposal required analysis and appropriate policies. It has only been
within the last decade, and primarily within the last five years, that
the transportation of nuclear materials has emerged as a significant
public issue.
Transportation technologies, safety considerations, routing strategies, liability assignment, and other topics all have been subject to
evaluation and debate, but perhaps the most contentious issue of all
has been the one of state-federal jurisdictional relations regarding the
regulation of such shipments. From the states' (and local communities') viewpoints, public safety is paramount, and under our constitutional system public safety is properly a state and local responsibility.
From the federal viewpoint, the freedom of movement for interstate
commerce is at stake, as are, indirectly, national policies on energy
and defense. In recent years there has arisen the anomalous situation
of state and local governments promulgating transportation regulations which very likely are subject to federal preemption, and yet the
federal government, while opposing them, is manifestly reluctant to
bring legal challenge to these regulations. The trend toward proliferation of state and local regulations in this area has continued, and correspondingly the need for a resolution has become more evident. The
urgency of the issue was underscored recently by W. England: "The
transportation sector, the life blood of the nuclear fuel cycle, has
*The author is Professor of Economics at the University of New Mexico. This article is
based in part on research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and the New Mexico
Energy and Minerals Department; however, the responsibility for the views expressed here is
solely the author's. Some of these issues presented in this article are discussed in Cummings,

Burness, and Norton (1981), in the context of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (the WIPP),
scheduled for construction in New Mexico.
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been in a turmoil for the last two years ... as an integral part of [a]
needed energy transportation policy, the establishment of a predictable and rational regulatory framework for transportation is an absolute necessity."' Taking into account issues concerning both nuclear
waste transportation and identification of waste disposal sites, R.
Smith has remarked, "in the last three years it has become apparent
that intergovernmental relationships are perhaps the critical problem
in making progress toward solving the nation's nuclear waste problem." 2
A federal agency's view of the same impasse has been presented by
the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO):
Growing concern among the states, municipalities, and the general
public about the safety of transporting radioactive material has induced many states and municipalities to pass laws and regulations to
control the movement of radioactive materials .... Many of these

laws and regulations are more stringent and restrictive than those of
the Federal Government ....

In 1977 alone, 24 bills to regulate the

transportation of nuclear materials were introduced in 19 states....
Should this trend among the states continue, the movement of radio-

active material between different state and local jurisdictions could
be seriously impeded, and in some cases may be virtually stopped. 3

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974 was one
attempt to clarify federal regulatory authority in the area of transportation. In the words of England, "The major purpose of section
112 [of that Act] is clear: it definitely preempts inconsistent state
regulation of hazardous materials unless the Secretary of Transportation expressly approves such regulation."' 4 Federal authority in this
area, moreover, has origins which go back much further in time than
this 1974 legislation: "The source of the Federal government's regulatory power springs principally from the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. .

..

"'

On the other hand, states and local jurisdictions have considerable
authority in this area, based on "their inherent police powers to pro1. W. England, Recent Regudatory Developments Concerning the Transportationof Nuclear Fuel and Other Radioactive Materials, 7 ENVT'L LAW, 203,220 (1977).
2. R. F. SMITH, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY SITING, Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, B-HARC-31 1, at 1 (September

1979).
3. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO
IMPROVE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION,
EMD-79-18, at 30 (Report to the U.S. Congress by the Comptroller General, Washington,
D.C., May 7, 1979).

4. England, supra note 1, at 209.
5. Trosten & Ancarrow, Federal-State.LocalRelationships in TransportingRadioactive
Materials, 68 KY. L. REV. 251, 253 (1979-80).
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tect health and safety." 6 While prevailing legal opinion holds that
outright bans on the shipment of nuclear materials through a state or
locality, such as those promulgated by Connecticut and New York
City, are likely to be found in contravention of prior federal authority,7 nevertheless "state routing requirements that define the practical highway alternatives available to shippers are likely to be upheld." 8 More generally, nuclear materials transportation activities
"remain subject to the ordinary regulatory authority of state and
local governments, so long as such regulation does not unduly impede
interstate commerce." 9
In other words, a possible resolution of the jurisdictional issue
would permit states to participate in the regulation of radioactive
materials shipments, provided that their rulings are broadly consistent with federal regulations and that they do not result in a significant increase in the cost of such shipments. In fact states are invited
to so participate under the latest U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) highway routing regulations:
The [proposed regulations] would recognize action by appropriate
state agencies to designate non-Interstate public roads as preferred

highways, and to remove the preferred status of an Interstate highway if an equivalent route is provided.' 0
and:
The Department [of Transportation] believes that in the interest of
uniformity and safety, it is both appropriate and practical for many
routing decisions to be made at the State level. 1'
The Department of Transportation developed these regulations in
response to the need for resolution of the jurisdictional concerns,
but, as is discussed later in this article, the exact limits of state
authority in this field are far from clear. Ultimately, a series of court
rulings or congressional action may be required before the desired
clarification is achieved. As of August, 1980, twenty-six states had
entered into agreements with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
share regulatory responsibilities for nuclear shipments.' 2 But equally
importantly, there are a number of state and local rulings outstanding
6. Id. at 252.
7. Through a technicality, the New York City ban has been allowed to stand.
8. Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 5, at 290.
9. England, supra note 1, at 210.
10. 45 Fed. Reg. 7149 (1980).
11. 46 Fed. Reg. 5300 (1981).
12. National Conference of State Legislatures, Issues Brief: Radioactive Materials Transport, draft, p. 6 (August, 1980).
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which are of uncertain validity and which have yet to be tested in
court.
The content of the state and local regulations almost exclusively
concerns safety-related issues: routing, requirements for escort vehicles, time of day and week travel restrictions, insurance requirements,
and, to facilitate emergency response, prior notification and placarding procedures. Perhaps the most difficult of all these issues is routing, and for that reason the new DOT regulations have emphasized
state participation in the area of route selection. One way to reduce
the domain of conflict between states and the federal government is
to try to foster agreement on the criteria for route selection. Toward
this end, the DOT has published a set of guidelines for use by the
states in making their route selection decisions.' '
This article reviews a number of aspects of those guidelines, and of
hazardous material routing decisions in general, from a methodological viewpoint. The choice of mode, i.e., road vs. rail, is considered as
well. The concluding part of the article develops some implications
of this review for the current controversies over attempts to establish
routing procedures.
In the immediately succeeding section, some background material
is provided in the form of a discussion of what could happen as a
consequence of accidents in shipping radioactive materials, however
small the probabilities. Then the following sections discuss, respectively: evaluations of accident-free radiation exposure in transportation vs. possible exposure in the course of accidents; the use of expected-damages and expected-costs criteria for mode decisions; and
the interdependence of route and mode decisions, on both state and
regional levels. In methodological terms, one of the principal findings
is that evaluation of routing choices in terms of expected benefits
and expected costs, which is an extension of traditional benefit-cost
analysis to the case of probabilistic outcomes, is not defensible owing
to fundamental gaps in our knowledge. Instead, something akin to
the charges and standards approach used in environmental economics
may be more appropriate.
2. CONSEQUENCES OF RADIOLOGICAL TRANSPORTATION
ACCIDENTS
Obviously, there are many types of potential radiological transportation accidents. At one end of the spectrum is an event which is
13. U.S. Department of Transportation, Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway
Routes for Large Quantity Shipments of Radioactive Materials, draft, Washington, D.C.
(1981).
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more properly labeled "incident" than "accident." On a number of
occasions, radioactive shipments in the U.S. have been suspected to
emit greater radiation than regulations permit and, accordingly, measurements were made. In some cases, excessive radiation was found
and repairs to the packaging were made.' I It is not likely that bystanders received significant radiation doses in these cases, although
transport crew exposure may have been higher than desirable. At the
opposite extreme is a hypothetical accident in which thousands of
curae of radioactive materials escape. Fortunately, there have not
been any transportation accidents of this kind in the nuclear era and,
hence, characterizations of such accidents are somewhat speculative.
To date the accidents involving releases of radioactivity all have occurred with type A packages,' s which are the least resistant to stress
and which are used for shipments with a relatively low radioactive
content.
While we devote some space to a discussion of accident scenarios,
because of the lack of historical data in this area, this discussion
should not be taken to suggest that the chances of a severe accident
are anything but miniscule. In this article, we are addressing choices
within the realm of nuclear transport, and we do not evaluate the
safety performance of nuclear vs. non-nuclear shipments. To keep
matters in perspective, however, it is worth noting that there have
been no fatalities thus far in the transport of radioactive materials,
whereas in the shipment of other hazardous substances there were 81
fatalities from January 1, 1978, to December 31, 1980.16 During
this period there were a total of 289 reported incidents not all of
which were accidents, as noted above, involving radioactive shipments and 51,366 incidents involving shipments of other materials. In
the case of radiological transport, the safety issues are largely anticipatory. 7 On the other hand, neither should very low probabilities be
construed as implying that a shipping accident involving radioactive
14. The actual number of such incidents is no doubt greater than the number recorded.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has stated "perhaps 1 in 10 improperly closed packages is detected and reported." U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TO AND
FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (December, 1972).
15. Personal communication with J. McClure, Sandia National Laboratories.
16. Information supplied by Nancy Simmons from the Hazardous Material Incident System, managed by the Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration.
17. See O'Donnell & Mauro, A Cost-Benefit Comparison of Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Health and Safety Protective Measures and Regulations, 20 NUCLEAR SAFETY (September-October, 1979). Public safety programs and regulations lead to expenditures per life
saved which differ by orders of magnitude across and within industries, and in general more
is spent per life saved in nuclear power design than in many other industries.
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materials will never happen. An official of the DOT's Office of Hazardous Materials has stated, with regard to radioactive shipments in
general, "It is likely that someday some of these shipments will be involved in severe accidents."'1 8 Clearly nuclear shipments present some
kind of public health hazard, not necessarily as great as some other
activities do and, as discussed below, the nature of that hazard is not
known very precisely. One of the main points of the following review
is that there is considerable uncertainty about the kinds of risks inherent in shipping radioactive materials.
Defining the dimensions of a potential radiological transportation
accident is difficult, for it goes beyond simply postulating a particular
kind of truck or train accident at a given speed. The extent of container failure, and the corresponding amount of radioactivity released,
must be assumed. Also, the description must specify the degree of
dispersion of the radioactivity (over how large an area with what density), and this obviously depends in part on atmospheric conditions.
Other imponderables include the length of time that bystanders are
exposed (say, in backed-up traffic) before it becomes known that the
radioactivity has been released.
A comprehensive analysis also must take account of the fact that
radioactive releases could occur even without a vehicular accident if
the coolant surrounding high-level wastes were lost for a significant
length of time. Lastly, there is the consideration that sabotage could
occur, and the consequences therefrom have been analyzed in some
detail.' 9
To introduce the accident-scenario literature, it is useful to summarize the apparent professional consensus in terms of broad types
of events and whether they are possible (not probable), however remotely. The following events are listed in increasing order of probability:
i) Can a nuclear waste or spent fuel transportation accident give
rise to a nuclear explosion? No.
ii) Can a radiological transportation accident lead to radiation accident releases which threaten hundreds of fatalities? In the case
of sabotage of a plutonium or spent fuel shipment, yes. 20
Otherwise, no.
18. Shapely, Radioactive Cargoes: Record Good but the Problems Will Multiply, 172
SCIENCE 1318-1319 (June 25, 1971).
19. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, TRANSPORTATION OF RADIONUCLIDES IN URBAN ENVIRONS: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, NUREG/
CR-0743, SAND79-0369 (prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Albuquerque, N.M., July 1980).
20. Id.
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iii) Apart from the possibility of sabotage, can a nuclear waste shipment accident threaten tens of fatalities? This case represents
the boundary region where estimates are very uncertain. According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a severe truck or
train accident could imply 3 to 5 fatalities in an urban area if
the cargo were high-level waste, and no fatalities for transuranic
wastes. 2 1 However, these calculations are based on very low assumptions regarding the fraction of the radioactive material
which is released to the air (in, say, the smoke plume from a
fire). These assumed "release fractions" are 0.02%22 (.0002) for
contact-handled transuranic wastes and 0.1% for remote-handled
transuranic and high level wastes. 2 3 By contrast the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Hanford Waste Management
Operations states that for a severe truck accident involving contact-handled transuranic wastes "Experiments carried out at
Hanford indicate that from 10 to 50% of the material present in
combustible waste can be expected to be airborne." 2 4 For the
WIPP, the FEIS says "About 25% of the contact-handled TRU
waste is assumed to be ... combustible," 2 s and therefore application of the 10-50% rates from the Hanford study would indicate that 2.5% to 12.5% of the shipment's radioactivity could be
released in a severe truck accident. This computed overall release
fraction based on the two studies together is 125 to 625 times
that used in the WIPP FEIS. 2 6 Obviously, the hypothetical circumstances in the two cases are different, and we do not attempt
to argue that one is right and the other is wrong. It seems clear,
however, that the release fraction assumption is not predictable
with any precision. Therefore, to be conservative in planning for
emergency preparedness, it appears wise to allow for higher release fractions and to allow for the possibility that ten or more
radiological fatalities could be associated with extreme accidents
involving high-level wastes and spent fuel and that several fatali-

21. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT, DOE/EIS-0026 (October, 1980).
22. Id. at 6-33. This passage states that the "total airborne release [is] about 0.7% of a
drum's contents" from a shipment of 42 drums of contact-handled transuranic waste.
23. Id. at 6-32 to 6-34.
24. U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: WASTE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS,
HANFORD RESERVATION, ERDA-1538 at III 2-21 (December, 1975).
25. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 21, Vol. 1 at 6-32.
26. The discussion below regarding comments by the Association of American Railroads
also suggests that train accident release fractions could be higher than those used in the
WIPP FEIS under credible circumstances.
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ties could be associated
with accidents involving shipments of
27

transuranic wastes.
iv) Can a waste transportation accident be severe enough to warrant
the evacuation of hundreds and perhaps thousands of people?
Yes.

Apart from considerations related to possible loss of life, the economic costs of a radiological accident arise mainly from two sources:
the temporary denial of access to land and buildings, and the cost of
decontamination. Other factors which contribute to economic costs
include on-scene emergency response activities, radiological surveys
and security measures. For a large urban center like New York City,
studies funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
have shown that the total economic costs (excluding health effects)
of a serious radiological transport accident can exceed one billion dollars (at 1979 prices). 2 8 Cost estimates can be scaled by reference to
other cities' population densities and land values. For a city the size
of Albuquerque, N.M. (approximately 300,000), total economic costs
could be in the neighborhood of one hundred million dollars to three
hundred million dollars. 2 9
The costs given above are relevant for a severe accident in which
750 curies or more of long-lived radioisotopes are released to the atmosphere. Such an accident is very unlikely, but it can occur even
without sabotage. For releases of this magnitude or greater, the total
costs for the case of short-lived isotopes are lower by an order of
magnitude.3" In the next few paragraphs we survey a few of the more
severe radiological accident possibilities which have been analyzed.
A review of types of conceivable accidents reveals that criticality
(attaining a critical mass, thereby causing a fission reaction) could
occur but under circumstances which are hardly credible. A large
portion of the contents of a spent fuel shipment would have to be released from their special containers and thrown together, and then
covered with an insulating material. 3 1 According to an Atomic En27. For low-level shipments, the worst-case accident scenarios in the WIPP FEIS lead to
whole body population doses of 62-190 man-rem in small urban areas and 110-330 man-rem
in large urban areas. If we multiply these figures by 125, to allow for the higher release fractions, we arrive at doses of 6,750 to 41,250 man-rem. The accepted estimate for rate of cancer inducement from radiation exposure is about 1 cancer per 5000 man-rem, regardless of
how the exposure is distributed among the population. Therefore we would be estimating
1.5 to 8 cancers from the altered WIPP FEIS scenarios. It is stressed that these are very
rough calculations; they are presented only with the aim of emphasizing the range of uncertainty associated with any hypothetical calculation of the effects of radiological transportation accidents.
28. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, supra note 19, at 55-64.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 57.
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ergy Commission (AEC) study, it is possible to imagine a landslide or
flood causing such an occurrence, but the chance of such an occurrence is infinitesimally small. In any case, because of the shielding
effects of the earth or water, the consequences would not be as serious as many other kinds of accidents; for example, "In the unlikely
event of accidental criticality, the critical array likely would be disassembled by pressures developed during the reaction but a nuclear
explosion is impossible. The critical reaction would last only a few
seconds and probably would not recur. It is estimated that from 10
to 101 1 fissions might take place, but this would not be expected to
cause release of any radioactive materials from the fuel elements....
Persons within a few feet of such a critical assembly would receive a
lethal dose.... Persons beyond 100 feet would be unlikely to receive
serious radiation exposures.... The consequences would be reduced

because the reaction takes place in a moderator such as water which
acts both as a radiation shield and an absorber of some of the gaseous
fission products ....

,,I

2

The same reference describes a more plausible accident in which a
rail accident causes "moderate damage" to a spent -fuel cask and
hence the cask's mechanical cooling system becomes inoperative. If
the cask is left unattended for several hours,3 "some of the fuel may
reach a temperature at which the cladding will perforate ....

The

radioactivity released in such an accident could be as much as 5,500
curies of Kr-85, 0.1 curies of 1-131, and 650 curies of gross fission
products (including Cesium-137)."1 ' The AEC study estimates the
probability of such a rail accident at no more than one in one hundred million per reactor year.
A more recent study mentions credible accidents in which 9.1 million curies are released (rail) and 1.4 million curies are released
(truck) from spent fuel shipments. 3" Such extreme accidents are
estimated to occur with annual probabilities of one in one hundred
forty million and one in fifty million, respectively, and the assumed
dispersion pattern is such that at most one latent cancer fatality is
caused per accident (these probability calculations are based on the
presumed 1980 rate of shipments). The same study finds greater
threats to life in some kinds of shipments of unprocessed fuel.
A still more recent document, the WIPP FEIS, postulates a hypothetical rail accident involving spent fuel in which 8,240 curies are re32. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, supra note 14, app. B at 78-79.
33. Several rail accidents have occurred in which fires lasted more than 24 hours, and
fires can prohibit access to the damaged cargo.
34. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 85-86.
35. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 5-46 to 5-48.
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leased to the air (including 440 curies of Cesium- 137 and other volatile fission products). The annual frequency of this event is calculated
to be 1 in 50,000. If that occurred, for example, in Albuquerque,
about 100,000 people could be exposed to radiation from the airborne plume of particles, and some fatalities (possibly 10 or more)
could occur.3 6
Clearly these probabilities are a) low, and b) variable, and the associated outcomes differ significantly. One conclusion that emerges
from this brief review is that there obviously is no reliable way of
computing the mathematical expectation of damages resulting from
radiological transport accidents, in contrast to the case of other kinds
of accidents for which historical frequency data are available. Some
implications of this conclusion are discussed in section 3 below. Extreme accidents of this nature are very unlikely, but it is important to
recognize several important caveats which are relevant for these estimates for accident probabilities. First, not all shipping containers
have been tested to failure, and we do not know the effects of, say, a
severe rail accident with fires lasting several hours on the fraction of
radioactivity released. Second, possible human error in the construction and sealing (loading) of shipping containers has not been incorporated explicitly into the published accident analyses. A severe accident involving a vehicle carrying defective or improperly sealed waste
containers is likely to be the most damaging in its consequences. According to the NRC reports on transportation-related radioactive
material incidents in 1975, 8 of 19 incidents were attributable to
"human error and deviations from accepted quality assurance practices." 3" A recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report
notes that "A 1976 Department of Transportation study showed
that faulty type A packages were associated with most of the radioactive releases in highway incidents."'3 Packaging problems cited
were loose and defective fittings or closures, corrosion, rust, and seam
failures. The GAO further notes that federal agencies do not inspect
shipping packages for integrity, but rather they rely on "shipper's
quality assurance records" without independent verification. 3
The one radiological transport accident study which does examine
human error assumes "that the maximum result of a human error is
36. See Land, Estimating Cancer Risks from Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation, 209
SCIENCE 1197-1203 (1980). The number of fatalities depends on the relationship between
man-rem of exposure, by organ, and mortality. This relationship still is debated, see the reference by Land for a health statistician's summary of these uncertainties.
37. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, supra note 19, at 75.
38. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 3.
39. Id.
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745

the release of all contaminated coolant water in the cask." 4" While it
is useful to study the implications of such an incident, this procedure
does not recognize the potentially more serious synergistic effect of
human error worsening accident consequences, for example by raising
release fractions. If a shipping container is faulty in its construction
or is improperly sealed, an accident could spill a greater proportion
of its contents.
A final caveat to the accident scenario literature concerns the railroads. Analysis by Clark, Foley, Hartman, and Larson 4 suggests
that, while the overall accident rate is lower for railroads than for
trucks, serious accidents occur with greater frequency on railroads,
and that the severity of some rail accidents far exceeds that of the
most severe truck accidents. Further, the Association of American
Railroads, in testimony before Congress, has pointed out that many
rail accidents involve much stronger crush forces and longer fire durations than those used in testing radioactive materials shipping containers. An analysis of 44 recent accidents (1976-78) of trains carrying hazardous materials which involved fires revealed that 32 of these
fires (73%) lasted over an hour, 28% burned for more than twentyfour hours, with two of these fires lasting over eight days. "Such data
cause us to be very apprehensive about moving nuclear casks in regular train service when they are required to withstand fires of only 30
minutes duration. Our analyses indicate that the number of cars derailed in mainline accidents does not increase significantly at speeds
greater than 35 mph. However, the average damages sustained by cars
derailed at higher speeds is almost two and one-half times greater
than those which occur at speeds of 35 mph." 4 2
In light of this testimony, it should be noted that the NRC classifies any train accident with fire duration of more than two hours and
impact speed of more than 15 mph as the "very most severe" (of
eight degrees of severity): all radioactive contents are released to the
atmosphere for type A containers and non-plutonium type B containers, and they could all be released for plutonium containers. 4 3
Also, train accidents with fire duration of more than one hour and
40. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, supra note 19, at 77.
41. R. CLARKE, J. FOLEY, W. HARTMAN, and D. LARSON, SEVERITIES OF
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS, SLA-74-0001 (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., July, 1976).
42. William J. Harris, Vice President of the Association of American Railroads, Letter to
Senator Adlai Stevenson, printed in HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE, on S.535 July 18, 19, and 20, 1979, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 64 (1979).
43. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 5-14, 5-22, 5-23.
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impact speeds of more than 15 mph could fall in the total release category.'

4

Although considerable efforts have been expended to design and
test shipping casks, representatives from the railroad industry also
have questioned the realism of shipping container integrity tests in
light of the nature of rail accidents. In related Congressional testimony, the Association of American Railroads made the following
statements regarding the government-sponsored container tests:
In the locomotive-truck crash tests, the trailer was adjusted vertically
so the cask would be just barely caught by the underframe of the
locomotive. The railcar barrier test used an old obsolete railcar of
extremely heavy design. The cask was restrained by hold-down grids
and cushioned by impact absorbers. And, therefore, I do not accept
the fact that those alleged crash tests achieved the objective of subjecting the cask to the maximum kind of credible accidents that we
have. In one case where we did challenge them on the effects of fires
of longer duration than in their specifications, when they conducted
the test as we proposed the lead melted down. I point out to you
that casks can be designed either with spent uranium as a radiation
shield, or with lead as a radiation shield. The lead, we have already
shown in a test shorter in time than the duration of fires we find in
many railroad accidents, did melt down. There had been no tests of
this kind, so far as I am able to ascertain, with casks that involved
the spent uranium material, which is a very brittle material. And
with the kind of deformation that we saw in some of the casks, there
4
is no question that they would have fractured and left voids. 1
Where does this controversy leave us? While accidents are more
likely to occur in truck shipments, bad accidents are more likely to
occur with trains, and they can be very bad indeed. It seems clear
that the research programs involving cask testing and construction of
accident scenarios should be extended so that the more severe train
accidents are analyzed, which has not been the case to date. Also, another conclusion which emerges from foregoing review is: If a radiological transport accident which does not involve sabotage is to
threaten tens or scores of fatalities (the region of uncertainty mentioned previously), it is likely to be a high-speed train accident.
These considerations suggest that one possible approach to risk
management would be to require that rail shipments be routed away
from the larger urban areas, and, where that is not possible, to ship in
trucks. In other words, choice of mode may be linked with choice of
44. Id.
45. Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, on S.535,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1979) (testimony by William J. Harris).
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route. However, this statement of the issue raises difficult trade-offs
from a public safety viewpoint. Does society prefer more "small"
accidents to fewer "large" accidents? The answer depends at least in
part on what is meant by "small," "large," and "more" and "fewer,"
and this point in turn raises methodological issues which are the subject of sections 3 and 4 below.
3. TRANSPORTATION-RELATED RADIATION EXPOSURE:
USE OF EXPECTED VALUES

Accidents are not the only source of radiation exposure in the
transportation of nuclear materials. All shipping containers emit
some radiation in the course of "normal" (accident-free) transportation. In fact, an index of radiotoxicity of shipments (the "transport
index") has been developed to measure the amount of radioactive
emissions passing through the outer surface of the packaging. 4 6
Given that each shipment exposes handlers and drivers to some
radiation, federal regulations have embodied two approaches to minimizing the public health consequences of that exposure. One approach is to regulate the total surface radioactivity permissible in any
one shipment, and to limit the amount of exposure that an individual
handler may receive. The other approach is to minimize shipment
times, insofar as other considerations allow.
In the planning documents for the WIPP, extensive calculations
have been made of the doses of radioactivity associated with normal
transportation. On the planning basis of five hundred truck and rail
shipments per year to the WIPP, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) calculates that the annual population exposure will be 5.54
man-rem, excluding transport crews, and that the crew exposure will
be about 22 man-rem. 4' In light of the estimate of approximately
5000 man-rem per cancer, 8 these clearly are small numbers. The
DOE study 4 further notes that, for the case of one major route,
that the "additional annual population dose.., from normal transportation ...is thus only about 0.001% of the dose received by the

same population from natural sources."
In spite of the apparently low significance of this factor the DOT
46. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 2-11 to 2-13.
47. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 6-24, 6-25.
48. This estimate is highly variable, depending on the organs affected and on the doseresponse model used to derive the estimate. For a thorough discussion of the issues involved
in developing such estimates see COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS (BEIR), NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW
LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1980).
49. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 6-23.
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has placed minimization of accident-free radiation exposure ahead of
accident avoidance in establishing priorities among criteria for route
selection.' 0 Routes of course may differ widely in safety factors,
travel time, potential population exposed to risk, and other variables,
and so the process of selecting a route implies judgments about the
relative importance of the various factors. The DOT priorities are embodied in guidelines to the states on routing decisions; in principle,
the states are free to modify the priorities assigned to different route
selection criteria, but in practice it may be difficult for states to do
so. For example, in the event of a suit over state liability in a radiological transportation accident, the question could arise as to whether
the state's route selection criteria were proper, and if the priorities
among the criteria differ from those recommended by the DOT, it is
not clear that the DOT would endorse the state's decision.
Hence the DOT's decision to place accident-free exposure ahead of
accident avoidance (and also economic accident risks ahead of public
health accident risks) is likely to strongly influence the choice of
radioactive materials transportation routes across the nation. When
we inquire into the methodological basis of this decision on priorities, we find that it derives from calculation of mathematical expectations: "A number of studies ... have shown that radiation expo-

sure from normal transportation is greater than the expected value
[mathematical expectation] of the radiation dose from accidental releases."' I However, the foregoing discussion has shown that there is
considerable professional disagreement over probabilities of accidents
by degree of severity and also over their consequences. A mathematical expectation defined over a discrete set of possible events is the
sum of all event probabilities times event outcomes. In this case the
outcome is the population's radiation exposure. It is worth stressing
that the expectation is the sum over all possible events. A reasonable
approximation can be made by grouping events with similar outcomes, but the point remains: all significant outcomes need to be included in the calculations. A probability distribution of outcomes, or
a reasonable discrete approximation thereof, is required. For radiological transportation accidents, these kinds of data simply are not
available, and hence a mathematical expectation cannot be formed
reliably.
To expand further on this point, obviously the historical data on
radiological transportation accidents are insufficient for estimation
of such a probability distribution, and hence simulated crash tests of
50. U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 13, at 3-22 to 3-24.
51. Id. at 3-23.
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container integrity have been used for attempting estimates of release
fractions (amounts of radioactivity released in accidents) and the
associated probabilities. The aforementioned testimony by the Association of American Railroads casts doubt on whether these tests
have covered the more extreme end of the spectrum, and this doubt
is reinforced by the previous consideration that accidents may involve
faulty packages, which would increase the release fraction.
Sandia National Laboratories have made commendable attempts to
increase our knowledge in this area, and they have attempted to estimate accident consequences and probabilities for each of eight levels
of severity, deriving independent release fractions for each level of
severity. However, to quote one of their reports, "The paucity of
data on package responses to severe accidents makes it difficult to
predict even the average release fraction [for each level of severity],
much less a distribution."' 2 In view of the discrepancies among estimated release fractions mentioned in section 2, and also the divergences in probability estimates, it can only be concluded that to date
there does not exist a reliable basis for computing expected values of
damages (e.g., of radiation exposure) from radiological transport
accidents. Correspondingly, decisions based on such expected values,
like DOT's ranking of route selection criteria, must be regarded at
present as not having a sound methodological basis.
If state-federal cooperation in the area of route selection for hazardous wastes is to be enhanced, the methodology has to be beyond
dispute, or the result may be further controversy. Unfortunately, the
DOT Guidelines do not satisfy this requirement. Another example
may be cited in which the guidelines' methodology is unclear. In this
case, we refer to the reasoning behind the decision to give higher
priority to avoidance of economic damages from accidents than to
avoidance of public health effects of accidents:
Estimates of public radiation exposures from postulated releases of
radioactive materials in transportation accidents have indicated that
most people who would be exposed to radioactive materials would
receive relatively small doses .... These doses are generally considered to be safe for an individual, although they could increase the
statistical incidence of some forms of cancer in the exposed population. Economic consequences from accidents, on the other hand, are
real and immediate. This would indicate that economic risks should
rank above [public health] accident risks in the priority list.5 '
Are economic damages more "real" than cancer? Because cancer
52. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 5-20.
53. U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 13, at 3-23.
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symptoms are less "immediate" than economic costs, are they less
important? Criteria for route selection which are based on reasoning
like this are not likely to command general support, and they will do
little to alleviate the state-federal tensions over routing and related
issues.
4. EXPECTED DAMAGE VS. COSTS: THE CASE OF SPECIAL TRAINS
Special trains have been proposed for the rail shipment of plutonium, spent fuel, and some high-level wastes. A special train would
obey the following restrictions:5 '
* Its speed would be no greater than 35 mph.
" When it meets or passes, or is passed by, another train, one of the
two trains would be required to stop while the other moves at a
speed of no more than 35 mph.
* The freight content must be uniform; in this case, a special train
could carry no nonradioactive freight.' '
The railroads have contended that special trains are required to ensure adequate safety in shipping radioactive materials, and they have
carried their contentions before the Interstate Commerce Commission. 6 One of their principal concerns is in regard to the possibility of
a high-speed derailment and rupture of a spent-fuel cask. Their doubts
about cask integrity in the event of extreme accidents have been cited
above, and they point out that is it possible for 200,000,000 footpounds of energy to be expended against the cask in a rail accident,
whereas federal standards for cask construction require resistance to
only 3,600 foot-pounds per square foot.5
When the advantages and costs of special trains were assessed by a
team from the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, s they found
that the gains in safety were not sufficient to warrant the additional
cost. That cost could be $19.2 million in 1985 (at 1977 prices) for
the shipment of 652 casks of spent fuel.5 9 The analysis rests heavily
54. R. RHOADS, M. CHAIS, J. DESTEESE, and W. LOSCUTOFF, PLACING THE
SPECIAL TRAINS ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE, PNL-SA-6519 (Report prepared for the U.S.
Department of Energy, Richland, Washington, May, 1978).
55. Among other things, the uniform-freight requirement reduces the fire hazard in the
event of an accident.
56. MISSOURI-PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BEFORE
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, SPECIAL
TRAIN SERVICE NATIONWIDE (ICC Docket No. 36325, St. Louis, January 25, 1977).
57. Id. at 31.
58. W. LOSCUTOFF, E. MURPHY, L. CLARK, R. McKEE and R. HALL, A SAFETY
AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF SPECIAL TRAINS FOR THE SHIPMENT OF SPENT FUEL,
BNWL-2263 (Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, December,
1977 (hereinafter cited as LOSCUTOFF].
59. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 6-17.
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on the point that while the frequency of high-damage accidents
would be reduced with special trains, such accidents would not be
eliminated:
The 35 mph speed restriction does, therefore, appear to have some
potential for reducing the frequency of involvement of a spent fuel
cask in high dollar damage accidents, but it would not eliminate involvement in severe accidents. 6"
In other words, the reduction in expected severity of accidents is not
taken into account. The same omission occurs in the evaluation of
side or "raking" accidents:
It was found that currently about 71 percent of side or raking accidents occur with one train standing. The passing restriction, therefore, appears to have a negligible effect on the safety of spent fuel
transportation.6
Again, the reduced severity of accidents, which would be associated
with slower speeds, is not accounted for.
These curious omissions of analysis were rectified in an NRC study
which explicitly adopted an expected-value approach. The NRC document points out that the Loscutoff study
overlooks some very important points ... [which] are the following:
1. With special trains, less damage is likely if an accident does occur.
2. A serious derailment would be less likely because of shorter train
length....
3. Fewer switching mishaps would be expected because there is
much less switching....
4. Cleanup operations, should major derailment occur, might be
easier if the accident involved a special train. ...
5. The actual transit time of the spent fuel is likely to be quite a bit

less than in regular train service ....

62

In order to fill some of these gaps, the NRC makes estimates of the
probability of accidents of different degrees of severity, in regular
train service. For example, it is calculated that an accident involving
release of one hundred percent of the contents of a spent fuel shipment would occur once in seven hundred years, and that ten percent
of the contents would be released once every 76 years, on the average. 6
By attributing dollar values to the damages arising from these var60. LOSCUTOFF, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 6-14 to 6-16.

63. Id.
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ious kinds of accidents, including loss of life, the NRC study concludes that special trains, by avoiding the more severe accidents,
would yield savings of $1 million per year, on the average. However,
as the cost of operating special trains would be about 19 times that
figure, the study concludes that the special
train mode "does not ap6
pear to be a cost-effective alternative." 4
The railroads and the NRC do not appear to differ greatly over
facts: a very bad radiological accident could occur in regular train
service, and special trains would substantially reduce their likelihood
of occurring. Perhaps the railroads would assign a higher probability
to such accidents, but apart from that there appears to be agreement.
The divergence of opinion concerns the subjective evaluation of these
facts. The railroads are adopting a safety-over-cost criterion: they
wish to adopt policies which eliminate, to the degree feasible, the
chance of a very bad accident. The NRC, on the other hand, deals
with expected values. As long as this difference in approach continues, attempts to refine the relevant probability estimates will not resolve the dispute. Similar methodological questions may be raised
about many modern technological activities which may cause highconsequence, low-probability accidents.
The railroads' position has a precedent in the decision to construct
facilities for unloading LNG tankers offshore. That decision was
based on the potentially catastrophic magnitude of an LNG explosion next to the shore, not on its probability. On the other hand, the
railroads' viewpoint ignores budgetary realities. Widespread adoption
of the safety-over-cost criterion could lead to very different expenditures per expected life saved across different industries and activities.
In overall terms, that would not be an efficient manner of promoting
public safety.
The NRC's approach is, as noted, a straightforward extension of
benefit-cost analysis to the probabilistic realm. In that sense, the approach has considerable precedent in the entire area of evaluation of
public programs. The doubts which may be raised about it are three:
a) as demonstrated above, the computed expected values cannot be
regarded as very reliable; b) there is no accepted theory of decisionmaking under mortal risk, and there is an increasing body of evidence
that the general public is disproportionately averse to catastrophic
events, i.e., they may be more averse to a large accident involving one
hundred fatalities than to one hundred small accidents over time,
each involving one fatality; 6 s and c) in other cases of uncertainty or
64. Id. at 6-19.
65. Burness, Cummings & Norton, Perceived Risk and CatastrophicEvents, draft 1980,
and Starr, Rudman & Whipple, PhilosophicalBasis for Risk Analysis, 1 ANNUAL REVIEW
OF ENERGY 629-662 (1976).
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possibly extreme outcomes, public policy has found it preferable not
to use benefit-cost analysis, but rather to establish a policy goal or
target, and then seek the most efficient means of attaining it.
Abundant examples of the approach in point c) are found in the
realm of environmental economics. 6 6 The quotas on effluent discharges into Lakes Erie and Ontario were not established on the basis
of measurements of the quantitative (economic) benefits of pollution
abatement, and the associated costs. Rather, biologists established
physical and biological standards consistent with maintenance of
aquatic life in the lakes. Economics, of course, helps the industries on
the lake select the most efficient ways of meeting those standards.
Dales has argued the point forcefully:
In brief, it seems to me that it is unrealistic to view water management as a problem in externalities, and that the question of how
water is used is purely a matter of collective decision-making. Economics cannot be of any significant help in making this decision...
because the values of amenity uses of water-recreation, and the
simple aesthetic satisfaction that most of us gain from looking at, or
even merely contemplating the existence of, clean water-cannot be
measured.... 67
The question here is whether public safety (or its inverse, mortal
risk) should be treated analytically in the same fashion as other environmental goods like air and public waters. Mishan 6 1 has argued correctly that economic theory does not provide us a basis for valuing
loss of life. On a simple level, it can be pointed out that the existing
procedures of valuing a life via the discounted stream of earnings
yields no value for non-workers (housewives, grandmothers), nor for
infants, given the long time lapse before their earnings commence.
Thus, one of the important benefits of public safety-increased life
expectancy-still cannot be valued in a fully defensible manner. In
addition, we have the aforementioned consideration that the public
may be disproportionately averse to large-scale catastrophies-a topic
which is beyond the scope of this paper to explore further.
Adoption of a standards approach instead of benefit-cost analysis
could mean absolute avoidance of potentially catastrophic situations
-or strong efforts to minimize the probability of such occurrences,
as in the LNG tanker case-instead of basing decisions on computed
66. W. BAUMOL and W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
Ch. 8 (1975).
67. Dales, Land, Water and Ownership, in R. Dorfman and N. S. Dorfman (eds.), ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, SELECTED READINGS, at 239 (1977).
68. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (July-August, 1971).
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expected values.6 9 Difficult questions would remain in some cases:
what is a catastrophe? One that threatens one thousand fatalities?
Five hundred? Ten thousand? How would we define sufficiently
strong efforts to minimize the chance of such an event? In the special
trains case, the choice is discrete rather than continuous, and so the
decision framework would be simpler. Adoption of the standards approach would mean mandating the shipment by special train of the
most hazardous radioactive materials. Many choice situations may involve only a few discrete alternatives, and so in fact it may not be
necessary to define "a catastrophe" in order to implement frequently
the standards approach.
It is not the intent of this article to advocate use of special trains,
nor to argue for adoption of the standards approach. Instead, the intent is to point out that the methodological basis is not firm for decisions on issues like special trains and the establishment of priorities in
the DOT's routing guidelines. And, given that the basis is not firm,
methodological issues deserve much more scrutiny, particularly on
the part of public agencies concerned with the transport of nuclear
materials. There are at least two alternative decision frameworks available: the expected-value extension of economic benefit-cost analysis,
and the standards approach of environmental policy. Given that public safety is an environmental attribute, and that important objections
may be raised to the first framework, consideration of both alternatives would appear warranted before one of them is implemented.
5. ROUTES AND MODES ON A REGIONAL BASIS

The earlier discussion pointed out that routing and mode decisions
may be interdependent. For example, in the case of the shipments to
the WIPP in New Mexico, if passing through the state's major metropolitan area is to be avoided for shipments arriving from the north,
then trucks must be used, owing to the configuration of the rail network. 7" Such instances can be expected to arise in routing decisions
for other states, and their existence defines a limitation to the applicability of the new regulations for highway routing of radioactive
materials. 7
69. The standards approach essentially formed the basis for the New York City decision
to ban the shipment of highly radioactive materials through that jurisdiction. See Solon,
Some Public Health and Regulatory Aspects in the Transportationof Radioactive Materials
Involving the City of New York (Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1978).
70. R. G. CUMMINGS, H. S. BURNESS, and R. D. NORTON, THE PROPOSED WASTE
ISOLATION PILOT PROJECT (WIPP) AND IMPACTS IN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
A SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 7.36 (Albuquerque, N.M., March, 1981).
71. 46 Fed. Reg. 5298-5318 (1981).

October 19811]

ROUTING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

More generally, a state's ability to select an alternative (non-interstate) route for radioactive shipments will be limited by the lack of
coordination with other states. The results of transportation safety
analysis which are carried out by one state alone could be invalidated
if the route segments lying in other states were taken into account.
More likely, neighboring states simply may not choose to exercise
their option to evaluate alternatives to the Interstate system for
radioactive shipments. In practice, without arrangements for cooperation among states in the evaluation of alternative routes, the DOT
provision for state participation in routing decisions is likely to prove
meaningless.
This point was alluded to briefly in a recent report of a State Planning Council workshop on the transportation of radioactive materials,72 but to date there has not been any movement toward regional
consideration of these issues. For high-level wastes, reactor fuel, and
spent fuel, there are relatively few points of origin and destination in
the nation, and hence a regional evaluation of routing choices, including mode choices, would be more practicable than the efforts required to implement the procedures in the DOT's guidelines 7 for
fifty states. Such a regional mechanism could contribute to alleviating
the state-federal conflicts discussed at the beginning of this article.

72. TRANSPORTATION WORKSHOP, STATE PLANNING COUNCIL ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, REPORT TO THE STATE PLANNING COUNCIL ON
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 16 (Washington, D.C. 1981).
73. U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 13.

